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CAPM is one of the first models created to explain returns. However, previous literature shows 
that the model fails to account correctly for risk. Recent researchers suggest that using downside 
risk is an improvement over the CAPM. My work generalizes the idea of asymmetric beta using 
alternative thresholds. For this study, I first replicate previous results to show that indeed 
downside risk provides an improvement of results, and then construct portfolios to see whether 
the new extreme betas defined work better than those simple downside / upside betas. However, 
the new methodology does not improve the downside risk model. 






















Background and Motivation 
The first model students come to learn when entering the finance world, is the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model, known as CAPM. According to this model, returns are explained by a single 
factor: systematic risk. Therefore, for a beta of one, no excess returns should be generated, as 
it means perfect correlation with the market. The author goes on to suggest that the only way 
to improve returns, is to increase its risk exposure. However, this theory is not backed by 
empirical research that show that CAPM beta does not explain average excess returns as it 
should. More recently, several studies were conducted for a downside risk perspective. These 
studies find that substituting the CAPM beta with a downside beta, is an improvement to the 
previous model, as investors are more concerned with down states of the market. Several 
authors explain this with a risk aversion preference. In previous literature, different authors 
suggest different ways of measuring beta. Some define upside and downside betas for periods 
when the market returns are above or below the mean, some use the risk-free rate as a threshold, 
while others use a zero-market return to separate the two. My work generalizes the asymmetric 
beta idea, using alternative thresholds. I assume that if investors care more about negative 
market periods, they will care even more for extreme negative market periods. Therefore, it is 
my interest to check on whether extreme betas provide for any improvement to the previous 
models. 
The following sections of this paper are organized as follow: Section II provides an overview 
of previous literature and findings. Section III briefly describes the data and methodology 
behind portfolio construction. Section IV presents the results. And Section V concludes this 






One of the first generally accepted models to explain returns in financial literature, is the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model. Introduced by William F. Sharpe (1946), this model defines expected 
returns, as a function of a systematic risk. However, researchers have found that this model 
does not predict returns accurately and is too simple to be applicable to real strategies since it 
only uses one single risk factor to explain stock returns. Some researchers document different 
characteristics that systematically affect returns. One of the most well-known studies is the 
Fama-French Three Factor Model that adds firm size, and book-to-market equity to the market, 
as their risk factors. Still, traditional portfolio construction models consider only a simple mean-
variance approach, underestimating the tail risk and the possibility of large drawdowns. Roy 
(1952) and Markowitz (1959) soon recognized that investors do not treat downside risk and 
total risk the same way. These authors proposed a portfolio construction based on semi-
variances, which weights upside and downside risk differently. Further research by Estrada 
(2007) shows that historically, stock returns exhibit an asymmetric distribution, rather than 
normal distribution, justifying an adjustment for upside and downside risks, instead of using 
same beta for both positive and negative market periods. The reason behind these new models 
is because investors dislike downside volatility, much more than they care for upside volatility. 
Therefore, a semi-variance approach is more useful than variance when distribution of returns 
is asymmetric. In line with this finding, Hogan and Warren (1974) and Bawa and Lindenberg 
(1977) also suggested the idea of extending the CAPM model into accounting for the 
asymmetric risk by developing a model where the regular beta is replaced with a new variable, 
the downside beta. This beta will measure the systematic downside risk for market downturns. 
Other authors, such as Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Gul (1991), suggested different 
models that include a loss aversion preference to weight the risks. Additionally, Price, Price 
and Nantell (1982) focus on US stocks to show that historically, the estimates for downside 
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beta, differ systematically from their regular betas. They found that the regular beta fails to 
estimate the downside beta for low-beta and high-beta stocks correctly, fueling further studies. 
Some authors however, argue that downside risk focuses only on a particular subset of returns, 
corresponding to the market periods that meet some certain criteria, which may create biases. 
Another argument used, is that semi-variance is only useful for reduction of losses, as it looks 
only at negative periods. Therefore, it is important to further analyze these questions. For 
example, Pederson and Hwang (2007) perform research for UK equity data and show that even 
though the downside beta has explanatory power in addition to the CAPM model, the benefits 
are ‘not large enough to improve asset pricing models significantly’. 
The impact of downside risk was also studied on momentum strategies (Dobrynskaya (2014)), 
which is one of the most known anomalies on the financial markets, previously described by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The author shows that for momentum portfolios, the beta 
asymmetry is monotonically increasing from past losers to past winners, meaning winners 
minus losers are exposed to extra downside risk but hedge against upside risk, concluding her 
paper by stating that momentum is not an anomaly anymore. This is a very important paper as 
it uses beta asymmetry to explain momentum returns. One year later, Ang el Al. (2005) 
estimates the downside risk premium to be approximately 6% per year for stocks included on 
the CRSP. Hence, investors weight downside losses more heavily, demanding a higher 
compensation for bearing with that risk.  
However, there are contradictory studies against the linear relationship of risk and return. Baker, 
Bradley and Wurgler (2010) find a low risk anomaly and explain it with a discouragement in 
arbitrage activity between stocks with different characteristics. In a follow-up paper, Baker, 
Bradley and Taliaferro (2013), decompose this anomaly, into a micro and macro component. 
The micro component refers to the selection of specific stocks, while the macro component 
refers to the selection of specific industries and countries according to their risk profile. Korn 
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and Kuntz (2015) use S&P500 data from September 1988 to October 2014 to develop strategies 
that allocates different weights to high-beta and low-beta stocks while constructing indicators 
that exploit the market-timing component and show that their strategies generate large excess 
returns and high Sharpe ratios. 
Finally, Dobrynskaya (2010) finds that the downside factor applies not only for equities, but 
also applies for carry trade returns, explaining the high excess returns to these strategies. Lettau 
et al. (2013) also report that downside risk CAPM explains currency returns, and states that this 
model can “jointly rationalize the cross section of equity, equity index options, commodity, 
sovereign bond and currency returns, thus offering a unified risk view of these asset classes”. 
 
Data 
For the purpose of this research, data was extracted from the WRDS website. It includes 
monthly prices, holding period returns, delisted returns and number of shares for all the CRSP 
stocks. Each stock’s exchange code and share code was also extracted in order to treat the data 
for a more accurate analysis. The data ranges from December 1925 to December 2016. 
However, since we use a three-month period for the construction, the analysis will be for a 
slightly shorter timeframe. For any given month, dividends are accounted for in the stock 
returns, and in case of delisting, it takes into account the value of the firm at delisting date. The 
exchange codes were used to filter only stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. 
The share codes were used to filter for common stocks only, thus excluding features such as 
depository receipts, REITs, and preferred stocks. The market capitalization was used in the 
portfolio construction. And finally, the risk-free rate used to calculate excess returns is taken 





For this research, several portfolios using different sorts were computed for the analysis. This 
aggregation of stocks into portfolios is proved to improve the precision of beta estimation by 
Friend and Blume (1970). This should work because as expected returns and market betas have 
a linear relationship, if CAPM explains security returns, it should also explain portfolio returns. 
They justify that working with portfolios, diversifyies away the estimation error. This 
aggregation routine is now standard in empirical tests and is the base for works such as the 
Fama and French (1993) model and their factor computation.  
As my benchmark, I computed the market returns, using a value-weighted approach on all 
CRSP firms incorporated in the US and listed either on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. 
Additionally, these stocks need to have a share code of 10 or 11 at the beginning of month T, 
shares, price data and a good return for the same period T. Next, we started computing betas. 
For its estimation, this paper uses a three-year lookback period, which is proved to be optimal 
by Groenewold and Fraser (1999) in their research, where they test the more well-known “five-
year rule of thumb”. Due to the time horizon considered, intuitively, from one month to another, 
the changes in beta should be small, unless in cases when the stocks experiences very high 
volatility. Therefore, I use the returns data for each stock to compute a rolling 36-month beta 
for any given period T. Note that these calculations are made so that we consider only stocks 
with a price higher than 5 for the end of T-1, thereby, excluding penny stocks. (Bhootra, 2011). 
The relevant definition we use to measure risk in this research is the following: 
𝛽𝑖𝑡  =  
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑡−36,𝑡−1(𝑟 𝑖,  𝑟𝑚) 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑚)
 
First, I try to replicate previous downside and upside beta results and try to understand not only 
if downside beta accounts for average returns better than the CAPM, but also whether portfolios 
sorted on past downside betas indeed forecast future downside betas. If it does indeed forecast 
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future downside betas, it will provide valuable insights for portfolio allocation purposes. The 
motivation for this comes from previous literature reported above that justifies higher average 
returns with an increased exposure to downside risk. Therefore, a portfolio construction and 
analysis seem to be in order, to check on whether there is any predictive power across downside 
beta ranks. For this initial analysis, a total of thirty portfolios were created. Ten corresponding 
to a regular beta sort, ten for the upside beta sort and another ten for the downside beta sort. We 
denote upside beta, as the beta for periods when the benchmark return is positive, i.e. above 
zero. The downside beta, on the other hand, is calculated using only periods when the 
benchmark return was negative. This essentially allows the investor to analyze return patterns 
for market upswings and downswings. I follow this by creating portfolios with different beta 
and downside beta values, to further dissect downside betas from urestricted betas and see the 
impact of the several combinations of these two characteristics. Essentially, I sort stocks into 
quintiles based on each of those characteristics and intercept each quintile to obtain portfolio 
values. This results in 25 different portfolios, with different combination of beta and downside 
beta values. Another approach I implemented to see the impact of downside beta, clear from 
the regular beta effect, is a double-sorting routine. To do this, first, stocks are allocated into 
different quintiles, sorted by regular betas. Then, for each quintile we use the downside beta 
values to allocate each stock that was allocated to each quintile, into new quintiles sorted by 
downside betas. It will result in 25 portfolios with different regular beta values as well as 
different downside beta values. Next, the stocks are aggregated, such that we take the average 
returns for the low downside beta portfolios, for the high downside beta portfolios, and all those 
in between, regardless of their regular betas. From these sorts I end up with 5 different 
portfolios, each with similar downside beta, but different regular betas. This will allow me to 
focus on the effect of pure downside beta. In other words, since the portfolios are aggregated 
across regular betas, all portfolios will contain stocks with different values for betas, and thus 
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the impact on returns derives solely from this downside beta. For these last few portfolios I 
choose to work with quintiles rather than deciles for simplicity, since we apply a double sorting 
routine. 
Second, as the contribution of this paper, I construct portfolios sorted on normal beta and 
extreme-beta and study whether these betas work better than simple downside and upside betas. 
The normal beta is defined by periods when the market return is under one standard deviation 
band. Extreme betas are calculated from volatile market periods when the market return is over 
the average past 36 months plus one standard deviation, and when the market return is under 
the average minus one standard deviation. By allocating the stocks into quintiles, we create 
portfolios by sorting each of the betas defined above. For these portfolios, we test both a one 
and a two standard deviation band to define extreme market conditions. Once again, the 
motivation for this analysis is to see whether investors place even higher premiums on extreme 




Portfolios sorted on unrestricted betas: 
The results obtained were widely consistent with previous literature. For portfolios constructed 
on unrestricted betas, we can see in Table 1 that across all deciles, the post-formation betas 
keep their monotonically increasing pattern, and hence, have predictive power. This pattern 
however is not verified for average returns. When analyzing the bottom and top decile, past 
betas seem to predict future returns, as we can see the lowest unrestricted beta portfolio has the 
lowest average return (0.46% per month), whereas the highest unrestricted beta has the highest 
average return (0.86% per month), which translates into a 5.54% return and 10.28% per year, 
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respectively. This means the difference between top decile and bottom decile is at 4.74% per 
year, with a beta spread of 1.06 significant with a t-stat of 28.08 (Table 1). For these portfolios, 
I followed by separating the beta from upside beta and downside beta and plot the relationship 
of average returns and betas. Graph 1 shows that when considering the regular beta, the equation 
has slope estimated at 0.0328, meaning that an increase in beta is linked with an increase in 
average returns, and an intercept estimated at 0.044 (4.4%) which is the alpha. An analysis on 
upside and downside betas let me conclude that downside betas explain average excess returns 
of these portfolios better than the regular beta (alpha decreases to 3.97%) while upside betas 
have less explanatory power (alpha increases to 4.62%). The slopes also tell us a good story. 
For the upside betas, the slope decreases to 0.0289, meaning the portfolios are less sensitive to 
positive market periods, while the focus on downside beta increases this slope to 0.0369. This 
slight increase in the beta coefficient is consistent with previous literature as it means that the 
average excess returns of the portfolios are more sensitive to market downturns. 
Portfolios sorted on upside beta / downside beta: 
For these portfolios, I no longer verify a monotonic increase in beta values from bottom to top 
decile since the post-formation beta decreases from the first to the second decile (Table 2 and 
3). However, the same analysis of returns applies. The portfolio constructed on the lowest 
upside beta has the lowest average return, with 6.73% per year, while the highest upside beta 
portfolio has average returns of 10.43% annually. The difference between top and bottom decile 
portfolios lowers to 3.70% after this breakdown (Table 3). When plotting all portfolios looking 
at regular beta values, the intercept and slope are 0.0378 and 0.0415, respectively. Consistent 
with previous literature, a focus on upside betas will not explain portfolio returns better, as the 
alpha will increase to 0.0462, while the slope decreases to 0.0324 (Graph 3).  
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On the other hand, a sort by downside betas will increase the difference between top and bottom 
deciles. The lowest downside beta portfolio will generate returns of 6.24% versus 11.25% 
generated by the highest downside beta portfolio which results in a difference of 5.01% 
annually, with a significant beta spread of 0.74 at a t-stat of 20.18 (Table 2). In this case, looking 
at the downside beta will result in a decrease in alpha (0.0294 to 0.0272), meaning it explains 
returns better than regular beta, and an increase in beta (0.0479 to 0.0495) reporting a greater 
sensitivity to negative market periods (Graph 2). We conclude therefore that using downside 
betas is a slight improvement from the regular unconditional beta, whereas using only an upside 
beta approach will yield worse results.  
Portfolios from interception of sorts by unrestricted beta and downside beta: 
The results from the interception portfolios are quite intriguing. For portfolios with the same 
beta, if we increase the downside beta, we can note a pattern of increasing returns, consistent 
with previous literature. Specifically, for the portfolios with the lowest regular beta, sorting by 
downside betas, results in a major difference between top and bottom quintiles, at 12.90% 
(Table 4). One explanation may be because the stocks with low regular betas, will have a more 
stable beta throughout time, therefore, a sort by increasing downside beta will have a clearer 
impact on returns. This analysis only fails for the portfolio with high regular beta. Unlike the 
previous portfolios, the reason for this may be because in the high beta portfolios, the beta 
already accounts for the stocks with the highest downside betas, and therefore an additional sort 
by increasing downside beta, will not yield any improvement on the results. However, these 
stocks are naturally much more volatile and harder to predict. When analyzing the average 
returns for portfolios that increase in beta but hold downside beta constant, the highest downside 
beta portfolio stands out, as there is a decreasing pattern to be noticed, although not monotonic. 
The top and bottom quintiles yield 7.44% and 18.58% respectively, with a difference of -
11.14% annually (Table 4). Here, it might be the case that for the highest downside beta 
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portfolios, the increase in beta is associated with an increase in upside betas, referring to stocks 
that are more correlated with positive market movements. Therefore, a higher upside beta would 
be in fact attractive for investors, who demand a lower premium for these stocks. It might be 
the case that this kind of breakpoint interception results in a very specific type of stock allocated 
in each portfolio. However, further analysis should be made to take better conclusions of these 
patterns.  
Portfolios double sorted by unrestricted beta and downside beta: 
The results yield that the lowest downside beta portfolios, aggregated across regular betas, 
generate an annual return of 7.04%, while the highest downside beta portfolio generates about 
10.87%. The difference between top and bottom quintile portfolios is at 3.83%, with a beta of 
0.28 relevant with a t-stat of 16.48 (Table 7). Therefore, downside beta captures risk that is not 
priced by regular beta. Again, this should be expected because as I stated before, there should 
be a premium for holding stocks with higher downside risk, over stocks that are less correlated 
with the market in downturns. Note that the post-formation downside betas through portfolios 
1 to 5, have a monotonically increasing pattern. What is important to note is that also their 
unconditional beta values show the same pattern, which the aggregation across regular betas 
would not have predicted. Therefore, by doing this, the betas and downside betas of these 
portfolios are intrinsically linked. 
Portfolios sorted normal betas: 
For these portfolios, sorted by the normal beta, we can see there is a monotonic increase pattern 
of the average returns. Annually, the top quintile portfolio generates 10.68% versus 7.72% 
generated by the bottom quintile portfolio. This puts the difference between top and bottom 
quintile at 2.96%, with a beta of 0.66 significant with a t-stat of 25.31 (Table 8). For the normal 
beta, we can also note that there is also a strictly monotonic increase of the post-formation beta, 
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letting us conclude that the normal beta portfolios, have predictive power of future betas and 
future returns. However, if we dissect the betas between the both extreme positive and extreme 
negative betas, we reach different conclusions as we did for the unrestricted portfolios when 
we separated the upside and downside betas. We can see from Graph 5 that these portfolios 
sorted on normal beta seem to be more sensitive to periods when the market return is below the 
lower band (beta of 0.0455), and less sensitive to periods when the market is above the higher 
band (beta of 0.0247), compared to periods when the market returns is between that range (beta 
of 0.0428). This further proves that negative periods are of more concern for investors. Just like 
previously for the downside beta, this extreme negative beta does explain cross sectional 
average excess returns slightly better than the normal beta, as the alpha when using extreme 
negative betas decreases to 0.0445, from 0.048 observed by using normal betas (Graph 5). 
However, the validity of the analysis for extreme negative and positive periods is called into 
question when we see that the number of observations for periods when the market return is 
below the extreme negative band, is cut to around one tenth of the total number of observations. 
Portfolios sorted extreme positive betas and extreme negative betas: 
For the extreme positive beta case, this analysis will change. Here it is possible to see that the 
difference between top and bottom quintile yields a negative average return of -0.92%, with a 
beta of 0.31 significant with a t-stat of 11.67 (Table 9). Again, this finding is evidence that 
upside volatility is good and attractive for investors, therefore reporting a negative risk premium 
for this factor. Reason being that a higher correlation with a growing market gives the investor 
a higher rate of return, while a higher correlation with a declining market is unattractive for 
investors because it will cause them to lose money when they need it the most.  
For the downside volatility market, there is no clear pattern that arises from this extreme 
negative beta sorts. Even though the difference between top and bottom quintile yields a 
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positive average return, it returns only 1.01% on average (Table 10). In fact, the fourth quintile 
is the portfolio that has the lowest average return, followed by the second quintile. Therefore, 
there is no consistency in returns using this sorting routine, and no advantage in forming 
portfolios sorted on extreme negative betas. 
Portfolios sorted on normal betas (two standard deviations) 
When considering two standard deviations to define extreme moments, the analysis does not 
change much from then I considered only one standard deviation. The average excess returns 
and betas both have an increasing pattern. The lowest quintile portfolio yields 7.90% per year, 
while the top quintile portfolio yields 11.27%. This puts the difference between top and bottom 
quintile at 3.37% (Table 11), which is an increase from the difference when sorting portfolios 
on normal beta, as reported above. Again, if we consider only the extreme negative betas of the 
portfolios, the alpha will decrease from 0.0529 from the new normal beta, to 0.0402, while the 
alpha increases to 0.0637 for the extreme upside betas. I also observe that average returns are 
more sensitive to periods when the market return is below the lower band, and less sensitive to 
periods when the market return is above the higher band (Graph 8). 
Portfolios sorted on extreme positive and extreme negative betas (two standard deviations) 
For these portfolios I will provide the results in Tables 12 and 13, but will not provide any 
conclusion on these sorts because the data for more extreme markets will be very limited. 
During the construction I was able to see that for a more volatile downstate market conditions, 
only half of the betas were able to be computed, thus affecting the quintile construction and 
monthly returns. This is even more evident for periods of more volatile upside market 
conditions. For these portfolios, there is only returns for 124 months, compared to around the 
1019 months we analyze. This is because markets do not have very volatile periods for very 
long, whereas a normal market can be sustained for a very long time. Naturally, this problem 
15 
 
was not verified for the new normal betas, as expected, because as we use a two standard 
deviation band, by construction, more observations will fall into that range.  
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this research was to analyze the impact of different betas, measured by the 
market past average return and its standard deviation over the same period. To do so we 
separated this paper in two parts. Part I focuses on previous literature, by breaking down beta 
into upside and downside beta first and replicating previous findings. The goal was to not only 
try to understand if downside beta accounts for average returns better than the CAPM, but also 
whether past-beta sorted portfolios forecast future downside betas and returns. As expected, I 
obtained results consistent with previous literature that investors place a higher importance on 
downside beta. I also find that after portfolio construction, if we were to apply a zero-cost 
investment strategy that goes long the high beta stocks and shorts the low beta stocks, there will 
be both statistically and economically significant returns generated. This difference is 4.74% 
for the top minus bottom deciles, sorted by unrestricted beta, decreases to 3.71% for the 
portfolios sorted on upside beta, and increases slightly to 5.01% for portfolios sorted on 
downside beta. And thus, concluding that downside beta is a more relevant measure of 
systematic risk. Part II focuses on the new analysis on normal beta, which I define by being 
within one standard deviation of returns, and extreme positive and extreme negative betas, 
defined by when the market return is outside these bands. For these portfolios sorted on normal 
betas, we note a similar pattern of increasing average returns and the difference between top 
and bottom quintiles is significant and returns 2.96% annually. I find that these portfolios, are 
also more sensitive to extreme negative periods, and less sensitive to extreme upside periods. 
This finding gives further strength that investors care more about the extreme downside periods 
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when compared to extreme upside periods. Again, investors give a bigger importance to 
extreme market downturns because it is when they need money the most. However, a sort on 
betas for extreme downside or extreme upside market periods do not produce any improvement 
in returns. Finally, I redefine the normal beta period using two standard deviation bands instead 
of one standard deviation. This essentially, increases the number of observations for the normal 
beta, but further decreases the number of observations for extreme cases. Thus, no conclusion 
can be made by using extreme market betas as the number of observations for these periods is 
very limited.  For the portfolios sorted on the new normal beta measure however, the difference 
between top and bottom deciles increases from 2.96% to 3.37% annually.  
In short, I find that none of the new measures provides an improvement over the downside risk 
model that generates a mean spread of 5.01%. 
Issues and further research directions 
For the purpose of this paper we did not account for several other characteristics that might 
have an effect on the stocks. For a deeper analysis and understanding, the researcher should 
take into account several other well-known characteristics such as size, book-to-market, 
momentum, volatility, coskewness, cokurtosis, liquidity, and others. Another problem across 
papers is regarding to betas. The beta estimates will differ from the true betas of different 
companies as this model does not take into account specific events, such as a firm levering up, 
increasing its risk and true beta. One last consideration is left to be made. Even though stock 
aggregation into portfolios provides a much easier analysis, Ang, Liu and Schwarz (2017) find 
that aggregation of stocks does not result into better estimates. Rather, by aggregating them, we 
are losing relevant information.  
I want also to refer to the fact that despite all the support Downside CAPM has gotten, it is not 
a model consistent with diversification purposes and portfolio theory, as Cheremushkin (2009) 
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finds that semi-variance fails to account for the upside potential returns to hedge against 
downside returns of another stock. 
For future research other methodologies may be applied in order to further analyze this 
asymmetric beta idea and correct for the missing observations on the extreme market conditions 
case. It could perhaps, instead of constructing deciles based on periods when the market return 
is below (above) the average market return minus (plus) one standard deviation, construct them 
using a symmetric percentile approach. For example, define these extreme conditions as the 
sensitivity to market returns being below the 20th percentile or above the 80th percentile of the 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1 
Av.ret 0,46% 0,55% 0,63% 0,69% 0,76% 0,66% 0,74% 0,67% 0,72% 0,86% 0,39% 
St.dev 4,66% 4,39% 5,02% 5,49% 6,04% 6,34% 7,20% 7,56% 8,49% 10,18% 8,41% 
Beta 0,65 0,70 0,86 0,96 1,07 1,13 1,29 1,36 1,50 1,71 1,06 
t-stat beta 34,54 48,90 63,59 72,19 77,32 81,28 83,17 86,92 74,36 58,39 28,08 
Annual Ret 5,54% 6,57% 7,59% 8,27% 9,15% 7,94% 8,87% 8,04% 8,66% 10,28% 4,74% 
Upside beta 0,59 0,68 0,90 1,04 1,20 1,21 1,47 1,45 1,65 1,80 1,21 
Downside 
beta 
0,78 0,82 0,88 0,95 1,04 1,10 1,20 1,37 1,42 1,64 0,85 
Table 1 – Statistics for portfolios sorted on unrestricted betas 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1 
Av.ret 0,52% 0,56% 0,63% 0,64% 0,64% 0,73% 0,78% 0,63% 0,72% 0,94% 0,42% 
St.dev 5,30% 4,68% 5,05% 5,29% 5,66% 5,96% 6,55% 7,11% 7,96% 9,44% 7,24% 
Beta 0,80 0,78 0,89 0,95 1,01 1,06 1,17 1,25 1,39 1,54 0,73 
t-stat beta 41,79 57,30 75,46 83,43 82,61 77,49 82,68 74,59 70,94 52,06 20,18 
Annual Ret 6,24% 6,75% 7,55% 7,68% 7,68% 8,71% 9,34% 7,61% 8,60% 11,25% 5,01% 
Downside 
beta 
0,89 0,85 0,88 0,93 1,01 1,03 1,15 1,26 1,32 1,60 0,70 
Table 2 – Statistics for portfolios sorted on downside beta 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1 
Av.ret 0,56% 0,61% 0,64% 0,67% 0,66% 0,72% 0,71% 0,68% 0,75% 0,87% 0,31% 
St.dev 5,76% 5,05% 5,13% 5,20% 5,70% 6,00% 6,45% 6,92% 7,45% 8,72% 6,47% 
Beta 0,88 0,82 0,87 0,92 1,01 1,07 1,15 1,24 1,32 1,45 0,57 
t-stat beta 42,11 50,62 60,12 75,18 76,59 80,51 81,09 82,24 76,02 55,62 16,76 
Annual Ret 6,73% 7,31% 7,70% 8,08% 7,88% 8,59% 8,47% 8,17% 8,95% 10,43% 3,70% 
Upside beta 0,81 0,80 0,87 0,94 1,11 1,10 1,22 1,41 1,41 1,48 0,67 
Table 3 – Statistics for portfolios sorted on upside beta 
 Dbeta1 Dbeta2 Dbeta3 Dbeta4 Dbeta5 5--1 
beta1 5,67% 5,61% 7,47% 10,88% 18,58% 12,90% 
beta2 6,46% 8,62% 8,00% 11,02% 11,50% 5,04% 
beta3 7,76% 8,17% 8,89% 8,26% 9,31% 1,56% 
beta4 6,34% 7,80% 8,69% 8,04% 11,52% 5,18% 
beta5 8,40% 9,61% 7,16% 10,08% 7,44% -0,97% 
5--1 2,73% 4,00% -0,32% -0,80% -11,14% 
 
Table 4 – Average returns for each interception of regular and downside beta portfolios 
 
Dbeta1 Dbeta2 Dbeta3 Dbeta4 Dbeta5 
beta1 0,67 0,71 0,77 0,86 1,14 
beta2 0,98 0,88 0,89 1,01 0,86 
beta3 1,13 1,05 1,07 1,18 1,28 
beta4 1,23 1,33 1,32 1,29 1,38 
beta5 1,15 1,45 1,49 1,47 1,68 





Dbeta1 Dbeta2 Dbeta3 Dbeta4 Dbeta5 
beta1 0,79 0,73 0,85 0,87 0,99 
beta2 0,87 0,88 0,91 1,09 0,95 
beta3 1,22 1,03 1,06 1,12 1,26 
beta4 1,26 1,22 1,22 1,36 1,42 
beta5 1,39 1,46 1,30 1,40 1,64 
Table 6 – Post-formation downside betas for each interception of regular and downside beta portfolios 
 
1 2 3 4 5 5--1 
Av.ret 0,59% 0,67% 0,69% 0,67% 0,91% 0,32% 
St.dev 5,11% 5,86% 5,99% 6,31% 6,99% 3,19% 
Beta 0,96 1,10 1,11 1,15 1,24 0,28 
t-stat beta 157,13 142,84 124,36 100,16 77,33 16,48 
Annual 7,04% 8,01% 8,29% 7,98% 10,87% 3,83% 
DownsideBeta 0,99 1,05 1,13 1,16 1,27 0,28 
Table 7 – Statistics for portfolios double sorted on regular and downside beta and aggregated across regular betas 
 
1 2 3 4 5 5--1 
Av.ret 0,64% 0,71% 0,83% 0,86% 0,89% 0,25% 
St.dev 4,54% 4,58% 5,48% 6,66% 7,70% 5,23% 
Beta 0,79 0,86 1,06 1,28 1,45 0,66 
t-stat beta 54,14 83,34 101,51 95,33 80,57 25,31 
Annual 7,72% 8,57% 9,95% 10,31% 10,68% 2,96% 
+extreme beta 0,65 0,81 1,14 1,65 1,71 1,06 
-extreme beta 0,85 0,91 1,03 1,26 1,44 0,60 
Table 8 – Statistics for portfolios sorted on normal moments betas 
 
1 2 3 4 5 5--1 
Av.ret 0,88% 0,76% 0,76% 0,74% 0,80% -0,08% 
St.dev 5,28% 4,66% 4,99% 5,51% 6,75% 4,45% 
Sharpe 0,17 0,16 0,15 0,14 0,12 -0,02 
Beta 0,89 0,84 0,92 1,02 1,20 0,31 
Annual 10,53% 9,12% 9,15% 8,92% 9,61% -0,92% 
+extreme betas 0,75 0,77 1,09 1,25 1,40 0,65 
Table 9 – Statistics for portfolios sorted on extreme positive market betas 
 
1 2 3 4 5 5--1 
Av.ret 0,71% 0,69% 0,78% 0,62% 0,80% 0,08% 
St.dev 5,03% 4,61% 5,14% 5,69% 7,18% 4,82% 
Sharpe 0,14 0,15 0,15 0,11 0,11 0,02 
Beta 0,89 0,87 0,98 1,08 1,30 0,42 
Annual 8,54% 8,23% 9,37% 7,39% 9,55% 1,01% 
-extremebetas 0,93 0,95 0,97 1,19 1,30 0,37 
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1 2 3 4 5 5--1 
Av.ret 0,66% 0,72% 0,82% 0,81% 0,94% 0,28% 
St.dev 4,08% 4,86% 5,84% 6,76% 8,37% 6,18% 
Beta 0,68 0,92 1,12 1,30 1,56 0,87 
t-stat beta 47,58 87,58 97,76 98,79 76,32 31,28 
Annual 7,90% 8,61% 9,80% 9,76% 11,27% 3,37% 
+2extremebeta 0,59 0,94 1,34 1,51 1,94 1,35 
-2extremebeta 0,87 0,97 1,08 1,27 1,52 0,65 
Table 11 – Statistics for portfolios sorted on normal betas (two standard deviations) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Av.ret 0,01056 0,01124 0,009635 0,011815 0,009073 -0,003 
St.dev 0,07737 0,061087 0,055248 0,079091 0,07587 0,012751 
Beta 1,16658 0,938008 0,84272 1,214269 1,135253 -0,02928 
Annual 0,12676 0,134878 0,115624 0,14178 0,108879 -0,03596 
Table 12 – Statistics for portfolios sorted on extreme positive market betas 
 
1 2 3 4 5 5--1 
Av.ret 0,01111 0,009457 0,010025 0,010795 0,010608 -0,0005 
St.dev 0,06646 0,060898 0,063101 0,075137 0,080044 0,047368 
Beta 0,98045 0,922425 0,967647 1,1273 1,179974 0,199529 
Annual 0,13335 0,113487 0,120296 0,129544 0,1273 -0,00605 
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Graph 5 – Plot of average returns vs. beta, extreme positive market beta and extreme negative market beta for portfolios sorted 
on normal betas. 
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Graph 8 – Plot of average returns vs. beta, extreme positive market beta and extreme negative market beta for portfolios sorted 
on normal betas (two standard deviations). 
